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HEGEMON:
TRACING POWER THROUGH BODIES
OF LAW
Michael Dobber
'Ionce had a conversation with a high-ranking
member of the CPUSA ... who said that gay people
should stay in the closet because it sets a bad
example for the 'working class'. '
US gay activist, in conversation:
'The NSW-based Gay and Lesbian Rights Lobby recently
knocked back a push by bisexuals and transsexuals to be
accepted as part of its overall charter for lobbying ... Those
who resisted most strongly were AIDS Council of NSW
(ACON) president Peter Grogan, former Mardi Gras
president Richard Cobden, gay NSW parliamentary
member Paul O'Grady and interim head of the Australian
Council for Lesbian and Gay Rights, Carole Ruthcbild ...
Those against the inclusion ... said that bisexuals could
have lovers of the same sex but still resort to the 'safety' net
of a heterosexual lifestyle ... The Gay and Lesbian Rights
Lobby had earlier expelled Norrie May Welby under the
premise that May Welby's constant 'queer' arguments in
committee meetings had delayed work on important rights. ,
Issues.
Campaign 207/June '93
[T]he transvestite ... and even more the transsexual, seem
the ultimate victim of ... stigma ... so conditioned into the
male/female role dichotomy that the only way they can
accept their own homosexuality is by denying their bodies
... My personal belief (hope?) is that transvestism and
transsexism would disappear were our social norms not so
repressive of men who exhibit 'feminine' traits and vice
versa.'
Dennis Altman, Homosexual Oppression
'Each oppressed group tends to wear its oppression like a
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badge of honor, of proof that 'we are more oppressed than
anyone else, ' with the implication that this somehow makes
us better than anyone else ... [N]o one has a monopoly on
pain, anguish, and human suffering ... '
Dajenya, 'Sisterhood crosses gender preference lines'
POSTMODERN NARRATIVE/POSTMODERN
CONSCIOUSNESS - AN INTRODUCTION
Japanese American Marl Matsuda, in a keynote address to a Yale Law
School Conference on Women of Color and the Law, set forth women of
colour as a 'paradigm group' for the use of what she terms 'multiple
consciousness as jurisprudential method' (Matsuda 1989: 7-10). She argues
that women of colour, as outsiders, have developed a unique mode of
oppositional political praxis which enables them to at once operate within
existing institutional expressions of male/white/het power, including
traditional legal discourse, and also to operate outside this epistemic and
political space, confronting these institutions through the expression of their
direct experience of power from their position on the 'outside'. So
summarised, tension~ are clear. To what extent is it actually possible to at
once move within heteropatriarchal/white discursive space, and to articulate
experiences of oppression? Is the outsiders' ex.perience of power, and inter
alia, the law, translatable to the Master's tongue? Or may we, in claiming to
navigate at once both 'public' and 'private', 'inside' and 'outside' epistemic
space, thereby reinscribe the tex.ts which route currents of power? (Texts
which, as we shall observe, are written 'on' our bodies).
It should be noted that Matsuda is not advocating a traditional liberal
model here - she argues that 'outsiders, including feminists and people of
colour, have embraced legalism as a tool of necessity, making legal
consciousness their own in order to attack injustice' (Matsuda 1989: 8), but
also that (what in keeping with her teffilinology we may term) 'outsider
consciousness' must be maintained alongside this.
[T]o the feminist lawyer faced with pregnant teenagers
seeking abortions it would be absurd to reject the use of an
elitist legal system, or the use of the concept of rights, when
such use is necessary to meet the immediate needs of her
client. There are times to stand outside the courtroom door
and say 'this procedure is a farce, this legal system is
corrupt, justice will never prevail in this land as long as
privilege rules in the courtroom.' There are times to stand
inside the courtroom and say 'this is a nation of laws, laws
recognising fundamental values of rights, equality and
personhood.' (Matsuda 1989: 8)
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An important question, and one Matsuda frankly acknowledges, is how
to determine which location is appropriate in which instance. But there are
further difficulties. She urges lawyers to make a deliberate choice to see the
world from the standpoint of the most oppressed. This position is
reminiscent of that adopted by feminist theorist Sandra Harding:
The logic of the standpoint epistemologies depends on the
understanding that the 'master's position' in any set of
dominating social relations tends to produce distorted
visions of the real regularities and underlying causal
tendencies in social relations ... The feminist standpoint
epistemologies argue that because men are in the master's
position vis-a-vis women, women's social experience -
conceptualised through the lenses of feminist theory - can
provide the grounds for a less distorted understanding of the
world around us. (Harding 1986: 191)
Matsuda considers that these outsider perspectives '[are] accessible to all
of us' (Matsuda 1989: 9). But is this true? How different is this request from
that of the modernist liberal philosopher who asks of us that we 'walk a mile
1
in the other man's shoes'?
I here hope to address two primary questions which the advent of a
heavily postmodem-influenced narrative/oppositional jurisprudence has
raised, in the specific context of the articulation of the concept dyads het-
homo and male-female~in contemporary jurisprudential and political
discursive practice, and to conduct an interrogation of 'identity politics' by
means of a Foucault-style mapping of the flows of power that these
discursive formations promote and enact.
Firstly, is it in fact possible to articulate an oppositional political
discourse while operating (even only intermittently) within established
heteropatriarchallwhite power systems? Can we both speak, Others' truths
and utilise the abstractions of standard master discourses?
Secondly, what political action does a broadly-speaking Matsudian
approach to the law (one which sets out to privilege the radically situated
voice) potentiate? What options are open to us as outsiders operating within
the legal institution? What tools are available other than the Masters'?
I here, wen, seek both to carry out the Matsudian project of oppositional
storytelling - in her words, the adoption of '[t]he reality and detail of
oppression [as] a starting point' - and at the same time to use such stories
to critique certain strains of postmodem-sponsored 'narrative jurisprudence' ,
as advocated in the cases of race, by Delgado (1989, 1990a, 1990b), of
colour and women, by Matsuda (1989), and of sexuality, by Fajer (1992).
I then examine the consequences of such a critique for non-het political
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praxis; and explore the possibilities afforded us by a Deleuze/Guattarian
theorisation of postmodem power.
THE LAW IN A DIFFERENT VOICE ..
Narrative jurisprudence and the
politics of identity
An epistemological schemata predicated in thingedness~ beloved of the
Greeks, and a constant of Western thought, is floundering. As horrific a.;;
Plato, as Aristotle, as Pope John Paul II may respectively consider it, Truth
is setting in the West. The laws of God, of Science, of Reason, of Nature, are
being usurped. In the language of Lyotard, critic of the post-modern, depth
is being exchanged for surface. Our epistemological universe is less and less
one of length, width and depth, and increasingly one of planes. We may no
longer dig deep to uncover sparkling diamonds, nor reach high to pluck the
fruits of knowledge of good and evil. Now, we think through perspectives,
our visions are situated on an epistemic and a political landscape, each of our
utterances per force reflect the particular gradient of our selves' particular
grassy knolls. Or p~rhaps we speak from nodes, where multiple perspectives
intersect. If this is so, we farewell the unitary conception of the seIfr the
supermaterial soul, which underlies and orders perception; and we become
fundamentally divided. The 'r can no longer claim even the trivial dignity of
being a 'bundle of perceptions'. Multiple 'I's continually arise and fade, each
adding their whine to the chorus/discord of chattering voices. The state of
Nature is very grave indeed. What does a radical posnnodem epistemology
and metaphysics leave of the Self? What are the implications of a putative
postmodem construction of Self, of I, for radical politics? And where is
gender, sexual orientation, desire, in such a world?
More specifically, if somewhat less grandly, where, after such a
cataclysm, stands the law? Yesterday, along with God, the Author died (q.v.
Barthes). It is mute testimony to the inherently conservative nature of the law
as institution ,that it considers itself to remain unchanged; indeed, it seems
barely to perceive that r/Revolution has occurred. Postmodem theory has
sought to undermine traditional epistemology by tracing the currents of
power we may map and channel in language. Traditional conceptions of the
law such as are taught in law schools reflect a Platonic epistemology. The
Common Law is a Platonic Form which actual ratios as instantiations
supposedly more or less approximate. The task of the lawyer is to sift the
ratio from the obiter, to weight the various authorities, and re construct the
ideal image of what the Law is. The work of lawyers is quintessentially, then.
language work. The postmodem account of truth has had devastating effects




New modes of what could once be broadly labelled 'left' theory are being
articulated within the postmodern moment. The narrative jurisprudence of
Delgado (1989), for example, favours the telling of stories by outgroups; or
more precisely, the telling of 'counterstories', which challenge the thinking
of the law (which inevitably renects the perceptions and theoretical
constructions of the dominant group(s)). A postmodern epistemology can
operate to legitimate this political practice/jurisprudential methodology. If
the idea of a determinate, discoverable Law is discarded in favour of local
truth and 'guilty language' (ie. the truth that language is not innocent with
respect to power), counterstories are authorised, and can become 'real law' ;
and argument based on counterstories must be entertained as a legitimate
source of law, both by the courts, and more broadly, by the legal academy.
There are problems which such a narrative jurisprudence has yet to
resolve, however. Storytelling as jurisprudential method, and multiple
consciousness as a conceptualisation of the analytical mode such a method
might entail, begs the vital question of which are the legitimate Others. It is
often implicitly assumed in such writing that there is some consensus
regarding the identity of the radically situated. In reality and stark contrast
however, oppositional discourses are themselves replete with systems for
domaining discourse and silencing voices. Who is a Real Other, who can tell
the Real counterstories, is a serious theoretical problem and the site of much
political conflict, as we shall see.
Further, there is the problem of 'behalfing'. While postmodernism may
perhaps legitimate othervoices, as bell hooks notes, 'as a discursive practice
it is dominated primarily by the voices of white male intellectuals and/or
academic elites who speak to and about one another with coded familiarity'
(hooks 1990: 2). If the discourse which potentiates the authorisation of
OtherSpeak is in fact inaccessible to (the bulk of) Others, this discourse is
merely potentially transformative, and nothing more. And in fact, this
discourse may serve ultimately to legitimate prevailing power hierarchies,
and further may facilitate the colonisation of the experience of Others (for if
all - including identity - is constructed, anyone can in principle speak
truth about anything). We thus have an image of a (white dominated, male
dominated) postmodemism which is fundamentally incestuous, self-
referential, enclosed. Divorcing itself as it does from the spaces of the voices
it supposedly legitimates, it becomes barren, self~perpetuating discourse
which never sojourns beyond its own discursive practice. If it is so
legitimating, why is it not producing other voices? Does a postrnodem
queery give rise to any new political praxis, or does it simply disable
traditional reform-oriented ones and simultaneously operate to allow white
males to speak for and/or silence (yet again) women. people of colour. etc?
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This leads us further to the question of the role of the contemporary
academic/intellectual, and to the much vexed question of the connection if
any which pertains between theory and praxis; and to an analysis of
postmodemism as social practice.
LastlYJ there is the fear that the privileging of radically situated voices
may lead to stereotyping which operates to oppress. (This is of course related
to issues of the intelligibility and utility of 'identity', and to the political
implications of the cultural mechanics of the production of identity as
prediscursive).
I here wish to interrogate two illegal identities, the bisexual and the t*.'1.
Both occupy an indeterminate intermediate middle ground, situated beyond
or across the binary systems of gender and sexual orientation.3 These binaries
I theorise as sign~systems ordering relations of power (they
filter/channel/silence speech) and I analyse them from the perspective of
both narrative jurisprudence/posUlloqern epistemology and the voices of
bisexuals and t*s.
I also select certain texts, 'jurisprudential' and otherwise, and attempt to
demonstrate how the language in terms of which the debates are framed and
enacted serves to prelimit outcomes; further, how these lingual limitations
are a function or a product of the conceptions we have of what is and what
is not 'real' jurisprudence, OfJ more broadly, of the boundaries of 'the
political' .
Of Kinsey surfers and the myth of
Sexuality
A rhetorical/epistemological strategy termed 'identity politics' is
presently enjoying currency in lesbian and gay discourse. Its efficacy is
increasingly called into doubt as conservative politics formulates and refines
counter-strategies. In the context of the present Tasmanian debate one of the
presently most successful involves the portrayal of what lesbian and gay
theorists would term lesbian and gay sexuality as a psychic disease, for
which the individual must be both pitied and treated (counselled). No doubt
lesbian and gay theory will develop new words in response. The question I
wish to pose here concerns the constancy of the epistemological base of
lesbian and gay politics.
I would argue that a revision of lesbian and gay theory from an explicitly
postmodem epistemological perspective is necessary if a debate potentially
infmite in length and ultimately of dubious utility between lesbian and gay
and anti-lesbian and gay theory is to be transcended.
I would maintain further, that connections or commonalities between
differently situated accounts of oppression may be more safely explored
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from such an epistemological base, while modernist accounts of truth and
power typically result in the relegation of the oppression of one group to the
ignoble status of epiphenomenon of the oppression of another.
The Gay Science (J'Don't tell me my
personal is not politicall')
Heterosexism is predicated upon a monosexual epistemology which
posits discrete categories, and specifically, the hetero~homo dyad. This dyad
may be deconstructed as symbiot - a self·perpetuating circuit of power
which operates to dominate speech. On such a reading, the bisexual is not
simply another Other. It is a free floating third tenn - the slippage, the
fissure, the rupture in the Logos of orientation - which may perhaps facilitate
Foucaultian resistance. I am suggesting that the figure of the bisexual may
constitute point suitable for poslmodem intervention into a gaystream master
discourse of sex and sexuality.
We exist not simply in a state of 'compulsory
heterosexuality'. We live in a state of compulsory sexuality.
The question might be posed: can a bisexual have a
sexuality?
Where is the closet? A staple of lesbian and gay discourse regarding
sexuality, this epistemic location is overripe. The dichotomy of closet/out
serves to police desire, tO~declare certain articulations (inter alia, identity-
grounded ones) acceptable and to prevent or penalise alternative ones. The
out gay is the gay who, for example, rejects his Christian faith, denouncing
it as oppressive and denouncing the retention of a Christian identity by some
gays as symptomatic of an 'internalised homophobia' (understood as the
unconscious and uncritical intemalisation of normative societal values,
including the devaluation of sex, sexuality and especially same-sex sexuality
- a type of false consciousness). The out lesbian is the lesbian who, say,
never sleeps with, nor expresses attraction to or interest in, men. Etcetera. By
positing a determinate Truth regarding desire, ie. a sexuality expressive of a
core or a deep Self. truths are bounded.
The Kinsey Institute recently conducted a study showing
that 46 percent of (self-labelled) lesbians reported having
sex with men since 1980. Many of these men had had sex
with other men. (Hutchins & Kaahumanu 1991: xxi)
Such speech silences radically situated voices, such as those ofbisexuaIs.
But further, such speech operates to inhibit the generation of identities
capable of speaking these truths. Hence we reach the assertion that there is
no such thing as an out bi. However, as Hutchins and Kaahumanu point out,
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that 'one drop of homosexuality indicates latent
homosexuality in a straight' theory sounds suspiciously like
the 'one drop of black blood makes you black and you can't
go to our schools' racist attitude in U.S. public schools last
generation. (Hutchins & Kaabumanu 1991: 8)
Where is out? The process of 'coming out' is an intriguing one, from an
epistemological perspective, as it embodies a number of (potentially
contradictory, destabilising) alternate readings of queer identity, and more
broadly, of the modem subject. The bisexual experience (if I may be
pemtitted this term) is informative here. Many bis have experienced and can
recount a definite point in their personal histories at whicb they came out to
themselves; that is, a moment when they began to self-identify as bisexual.
This point is somewbat different from the coming out experiences reported
4
by those identifying as lesbian or gay. Since lesbian and gay discourse - in
this respect, importantly, indistinguishable from the discourse of the
hetstream - posits a determinate,identity, a 'real' dimension or quality of the
subject in which lesbian or gay identification is grounded - put simply, a
'sexuality'-there is no immediate need for lesbians or gays to problematise
the epistemological status of their moment of identification. This moment
may be described/read simply as the point of recognition of the reality of
their situation (or, more dramatically, the point of liberation from false
consciousness). A biography of same-sex attractions and experiences may be
called upon to verify this identification. The bisexual, however, faces
epistemological crisis when reaching the moment of coming out to herself.
Coming from an either/or culture, a bi will initially identify as either
lesbian/gay or het. In the absence of a public, clearly delineated community
with a common language facilitating the demarcation ofexperience in accord
with erotic attraction, it is difficult to intetpret the decision to identify as bi
as a decision to recognise something hitherto hidden deep within oneself.
Rather, self-identification is often understood by bis to be a deliberate
decision to choose a label, an identity, and to read our own biography (and
future), through this identity. On coming out, our biography is
reread/rewritten.
The development of bisexual identity... involves
redefming our sexual orientation in accordance with a
decision to validate and give importance to previously
disregarded, or undeveloped, or newly emerging sexual and
affectional feelings and behaviour. Developing this identity
... fust involves re-evaluating and discarding an existing
self-defmition in which we have developed a degree of
investment. (Fox 1991: 31)
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'Coming out' is then not to recognise and unveil a repressed, secret Self;
it is to situate oneself within a series of meanings particular to
heteropatriarchy. Only the determinate identity - in the language of
Deleuze and Guattari, the arborescent queer - can 'come out'. The
unembodied, the schizophrenic, the nomad, the rhizome, the unidentified,
however, has no core truth to assert.
The situated out generates a situated liberation; even
sometimes a physically situated one. Oxford Street is
represented as a gay h(e)aven, and contrasted with redneck
'phobic Tasmania (recall for example the mid-1994 Buy
Right Campaign - a blanket ban on Tasmanian goods made
possible by the mainland lesbian and gay perception that
the Tasmanian qua Tasmanian is homophobic, ie. location
defines identity), or perhaps contrasted with the hick het
Outback (witness for example the portrayal of the outback
and its inhabitants in the recent Australian film The
Adventures ofPriscilla Queen ofthe Desert).
Note that, on such a reading of sexual identity, it is not possible to speak
of 'gay sex' or 'lesbian sex' or 'het sex', any more than it makes sense to
speak of 'bi sex'. All the first terms are sexualities, identities. Sex acts are
not identities. Subjects are. But only subjects have sexualities. Bisexuals are
not subjects (in so far as we and our claims are understood to be symptomatic
of internalised oppression). Hence there is no bi sexuality. In this sense it
may be said that bis and transgens both, are disembodied by master
discourse.
The Lore of the Excluded Middle
I'm not gay. I like women as much as the next man.
The unreflected adoption of traditional models of political theory and
praxis is always prone to lead us to simple transposition of the modes of
oppression which we are attempting to evade. It is axiomatic of feminism
that 'the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house' (Lorde 1984:
110). Lesbian/gay theory must be on its guard when seeking to renovate and
appropriate accounts formulated under beteropatriarchy.
Discrimination in our lesbian and gay communities against those who
self·identify as bisexual is the consequence of just such an error. The
widespread silencing of bisexuals in and outside our communities is a direct
product of the uncritical or insufficiently reflected importation of a
heterosexist epistemological perspective; a perspective which operates to
reinscribe the orientation and gender-ordered relations of power against
which we protest so vigorously.
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Rather than engage this 'essentialist' epistemology directly, I here present
what are fairly typical commonsensical notions regarding bisexuals and
bisexuality, and attempt to demonstrate how such narratives belie our
reporting of our own experience, and are grounded in what is at essence a
mainstream!'essentialist' construction of the subject, of identity, and which
can only operate to marginalise and to mute perverse desire.
This attempt at bi storytelling I would set in contrast to Fajer's article
'Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together?' (1992). Despite a commitment
expressed therein to inclusive storytelling, Fajer repeatedly marginalises and
erases bi experience(s). He adopts at the outset a tripartite taxonomy of the
queer universe composed of non-gay homophiles, closeted gays and out gays
(Fajer 1992: 534-5) - telling us by way ofparentbesis and footnote that 'gay'
can sometimes mean 'lesbian',s and that bisexuals experience oppression
only in so far as they are gay (or lesbian), with the implication that any
putative bi oppression is politica).ly speaking identical to gay (or lesbian)
oppression.6 Witness further, his (footnote) definition of 'true' biseXUality:
I mean, having sexual and affectional attractions for people
of both genders as opposed to engaging in sexual
intercourse witb one or the other gender without any real
attraction. (Fajer 1992: 549, foomote 187)
With reference to what criteria does one determine the 'realness' versus
the artifactuality of an individual's attractions? Fajer reities these categories
of real and unreal, true and false, and in so doing sites the power to authorise
speech squarely within lesbian and gay discursive space.
The myths I recount below seek to refute the naive view that bisexuals
cannot experience discrimination as bisexuals, and that bis cannot
experience this discrimination both at the hands of het and of lesbian and gay
cOlIUllunities.
\
Bisexuals do not exist
Truths of this type operate to delegitimate any putative bisexual voice,
that is the bisexual as authentic subject. If it can be demonstrated that the so-
called 'bisexual' is actually something else, then everything the individual bi
and the bi community might say about itself is suspect. These truths then
illustrate the manner in which the postulation of a unitary, determinate gay,
lesbian and/or homosexual identity serves to legitimate the colonisation of
bisexuals' experience.
'Isn't everyone really bisexual?'
The power to author is the power to authorise. While the hetstream
controls the language within which queer communities articulate and bound
themselves, the hetstream can authorise certain practices and suppress others
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(and the Others whom the practices define). The adoption of the label
'Queer' is one example of the appropriation of this power of authorship.
Who determines what and who is 'bisexual' is for this reason of vital import.
To assert universal bisexuality is in effect, if paradoxically, to assert that
there are no bisexuals. If anybody is capable of same-sex sex (which may
appear initially plausible given the morphological congruency of people
regardless of their differing erotic interests), it is pointless for any particular
group to claim the label bisexuality for themselves and to speak about
discrimination on this ground. There is no distinction to be made between
any 'bipbobia' and regular garden-variety 'homophobia'. Bisexuals become,
in effect, just another (if a little confused) bunch of lesbians and gays.
Tbe forgoing account of bisexual identity operates, then, to delete tbat
identity. It is not a statement of 'the way things are', it is a rhetorical program
evolved to marginalise the bisexual - who is convinced, despite
monosexualist assertions to the contrary, that she/he does have a voice, as bi,
and that this is qualitatively different from speaking as het, lesbian or gay.
'There is no such thing as bisexuality. '
A common belief is that any putative 'bi' sexuality is simply a transitional
period between the closet and an authentic lesbian/gay identity; that those
claiming to be bi are really lesbian or gay, but are, for whatever reason(s),
too scared or insecure to admit it. A het version of this myth asserts the
inverse, ie. that the bisexual is really het but for some reason seeks to
experiment (with a further implication that this is in some way inappropriate
or unhealthy, and the product of a confused or unbalanced personality). If it
is generally agreed among a group of people that you are either confused
about yourself, or scared and insecure, people are much less likely to take
what you say at face value. Your opinions, written or spoken, and your
choices, in your 'public' and your 'private' life, will all be assessed in the
light of this pervasive and overarching condition of instability. You find
yourself muted.
'Bisexuality is a cop out - these so-called <bisexuals' can hide
behind heterosexual privilege. <Bisexuality' is simply (yet another)
rationalisation for staying closeted and invisible. Bisexuals are
fence-sitters. When it really counts, bis won't come through for
their lesbian and gay sisters and brothers. '
This is a more refined and politically-charged amalgam of the previous
two myths. Once more, the contention is that there is no authentic bi
identity/voice/political situation, but rather that it is a politically
unacceptable mechanism enabling sporadic sorties into the OutWorld,
punctuated by desperate dives for closets when the intensity of oppression
makes being out too dangerous. In not having the courage to come out once
and for all and proclaim unreservedly their lesbian/gay selis, 'bis' are selling
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out to heterosexist paradigms and are hence complicit in the continuing
marginalisation and oppression of lesbian and gay people.
This argument would seem to stand or fallon whether one accepts the
existence of an authentic both-gender sexual orientation. Although
admittedly carrying quite some rhetorical force, this 'argument' of itself
answers nothing. It leaves all the important questions unasked, and aids both
speaker and audience in forgetting to ask them. lfthere were no people who
harboured desire for people of both genders, then it might be the case that
any claiming said desire were wimps and traitors. But there are individuals
who claim to be attracted to both genders, and hence there is, prima facie, an
authentic bisexual situation. Reasons remain to be evinced why these self-
reports should be dismissed. That these reports are the product of a closeted
perspective is a recursive argument. This rhetorical manoeuvre simply
reafftrms those who deny a 'real' bi sexuality in their exclusive practice and
discourse; and also, of course, it encourages bisexuals in both the het and the
lesbian and gay communities to remain closeted, 'passing' as het or a<;
lesbian or gay.
'True bisexuals are attracted equally to women and to men '.
'True bisexuals have concurrent partners of both genders. '
These assertions and others like them, rather than denying bi desire
outright, establish a conditional definition so narrow that few will qualify. If
one is not fucking both a man and a woman, in a publicly verifiable fashion,
at the particular time the claim to a hi identity is made, one is really
het/gay/lesbian and just confused or experimenting. Conversely, if one is in
a monogamous relationship, or if one has only ever 'had sex' with persons of
one gender, one cannot be bisexual. Such definitions can sometimes reach
quite bizarre extremes. For example: if one sleeps with more men than
women, or the reverse, one isn't really bisexual. Ifone comments in an erotic
fashion more about men than women, one is not bisexual either. If one
refuses any parqcular man or woman as sexual parmer, one is supposed to be
'really' lesbian ,or het respectively if one is female, or the reverse
respectively if one is male. More on such bounding of desire, later.
'Bisexuality cannot be a true orientation, because bisexuals choose
their identity while lesbians and gays have always been lesbian or
gay.'
The thinking woman's or man's anti-bi argument, it can command some
initial plausibility through appropriating the contentious and divisive debate
over the origin or aetiology of non-het desire (more commonly encountered
in its manifestations as the 'nature' versus 'nurture' and the 'choice' versus
'orientation' debates). Of course, the genesis of same-sex orientation and
same-sex sex acts is a moot point; indeed, the very language in which we
frame the debate is the subject of continual and ongoing critique. Given the
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stark lack of uniformity or consensus on these issues, it is simply not
possible to make the assertion above; one must also address the tensions
latent in such an account of 'orientation'. It is not at all clear, prima facie,
that bisexuals are not 'born bisexual' - there would appear to be no reason,
for example, why there may not be some genetic or pre-natal hormonal or
other biological and/or environmental base underlying bisexuality. Nor is it
clear that lesbians and gays are born lesbian and gay, at lealit in a
straightforward sense - it is well accepted now that the whole language of
sexual orientation and of homosexual identity has a quite specific historical
and cultural genesis, and to argue that there is (say) a determinate genetic
'cause' of same-sex sex acts and identity would seem to stand in tension with
such an historically situated account.
Bisexuals and relationships
These stories portray bisexuals as inherently unstable and untrustworthy.
Even if some real bis do exist, everyone would be better off if they didn't.
iBisexuals are promiscuous hypersexual hedonists, who have no
moral values and will try anyone and anything anywhere at
anytime. '
Interestingly, viewed as rhetorical tactic for the assignment of Other
status, the above is a direct pilfer from main-/malestream discursive practice.
The religious right (groups like Tas Alert and For A Caring Tasmania, for
example), too, sees the Other as-signifying and embodying all transgressive
acts. The Other is of its essence perverse, and there is no valuable distinction
to be made amongst its manifold manifestations. Heterosexist discourse
typically fails to distinguish between same-sex sex, paedopbilic practices,
predatory sexual behaviour. genderfuck, Communism, and any number of
other potentially threatening (immoral; destabilising) behaviours and self-
identifications. Similarly, lesbian and gay discourse tends to attribute
negatively-charged traits and practices to bisexuals; for example that they are
chronic sufferers of wanderlust (and the emphasis is generally on the latter
syllable) or of some variety of erotica-sexual psychopathology. The
mechanism operating here is one familiar to feminist theory, namely, the
sexualisation of the Other.
'Bisexuals cannot be monogamous. '
Clearly derivative of the 'concurrent lovers' construction of bi identity,
typical variations include 'a bisexual will always leave you for a man' and 'I
could take losing her to another woman. but how can I compete with a man?
I just couldn't take that.' Some bisexual people do reject monogamous
relationships, but so do some het and lesbian and gay people. There is no
inevitable relationship between a bisexual identification and promiscuity.
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'A monogamous married person or person in a long-term
monogamous relationship cannot be bisexual.'
This again denies bisexual's self-reports, and rests on a misconstruction
of the term 'orientation'. Bisexual identity does not (merely) signify an
individual's present sexual arrangements, it is also a statement regarding
erotic and affective interests and potentialities. To say that (for example) a
monogamous married woman or man is not 'really' bisexual is analogous to
saying that a celibate lesbian or gay is not 'really' lesbian or gay. Identity or
sexual orientation is more than simply present sexual practice.
Threats of bisexuality
'Bisexuals transmit disease.'
The notion that the transgression of natural boundaries pollutes is of
ancient lineage. As we are all too well aware, the advent of HIVIAIDS has
been particularly fortuitous for those seeking to promote traditional
beterosexist and patriarchal models of sexuality and relationship. Bisexuals,
like the gay community, have suffered from a popular equating of
countemormative sexual behaviour with Disease. There is a perception
among many lesbians and g"ays, emulating the view of many hets vis-a-vis
non-hets, that bis are disease~ridden. One female bi comments in
exasperation that the bisexual woman is seen as 'the 'Typhoid Mary' of the
lesbian community' (Krueger 1991: 280).
The reasoning here is that if everyone just fucks their own kind,
HIV/AIDS will not be a problem. This is to deny the oft-emphasised fact that
it is high-risk practices which spread the virus, and not sexual identities, nor
sexual-orientation-delineated communities.
Heterosexism and microfascism
There are many different biographies which lead many different women
and men to claim the label 'bisexual' for themselves. There is no unitary
third 'oIjentation' 'bisexuality'; and although there certainly is a developing
community, and hence an emerging 'bisexual voice', this is not to suggest
that there is a determinate and demonstrably extant state (be this putative
state described utilising the language of genetics, or of sociology, or of
psychology, or any other discipline) which grounds this historical moment.
It should after all be recalled that the language within which our politics of
lesbian and gay and bisexual and queer identity is conceived and articulated,
is the language of a heteropatriarchal culture. The advent of bisexuality in
Western queer discourse can operate to challenge the epistemological
framework which informs both 'het politics' and, consequently, presently,
the oppositional politics (be it termed gay or queer, be it essentially
assimilationist and reformist or radical and revolutionary in character) which
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has arisen in response.
We cannot buy into prevailing modes of discourse without thereby
compromising our radical situation. A recurrent dilemma in feminist
jurisprudence is whether one can speak both as woman and as judge. I would
argue that similarly there is a sense in which one cannot speak
simultaneously as queer and as 'scientist'. (By 'scientist' I mean, the
grounding of truth and falsehood in empirical, publicly accessible reality; as
is assumed, for example, within the discursive domain of the biological
sciences). Science, in its dual manifestations as knowledge construct and as
social practice, can only and will always reinscribe oppression, constituting
as it does a dominant form of discourse under heteropatriarchy. (To rephrase
this in straight Marxist terminology, science is part of the ideological
superstructure which maintains an economic culture which dis(.,'riminates
inter alia on grounds of signifiers of sexuality).
The particular manifestations of power, the relevant modes of oppression,
vary widely from group to group. It is clear that male and female feminists,
lesbians and gays, gays and t*, female bisexuals and lesbians, and so on,
although all suffering under heteropatriarchy, suffer in unique ways, and will
not always share political interests.
What is required is a recognition of the multivalency of language; that
this culture which oppresses us, uses not merely the law, not merely physical
force, but also the tools of thought to police our desire. The excluded middle,
the bisexual-as-subject, threatens the binary economy of desire which
ensures the continuation of the state of compulsory heterosexuality.
Such a critique may be seen to potentiate a recontlguring of the subject.
The reification of a bi identity certainly brings benefits - it facilitates the
recognition of a common experience of oppression, facilitates coalition-
building and combined political action. However there is the danger that this
trend will generate yet another domesticated identity, another disciplined
body. The rhizome sprouts roots.
MEMOIRS OF AN INVISIBLE
Two children are in a museum standing before a painting of
Adam and Eve. One asks: 'Which one's the boy and which
one's the girlT The other replies: 'I can't tell - they
haven't got their clothes on.'
I here attempt a close reading of particular but typical legal texts to
uncover traces of arborescence. I engage in a mapping of the relations of
power (inter alia 'gender') implied and rewritten by the texts, and investigate
the ways in which the outsider view of the hetstream (in this case, deriving
primarily from theorisation within the institutions of medicine and the law)
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are deployed to rationalise and institutionalise radical binarity.
Legal writing regarding the situation of the t* before the law almost
exclusively focuses on areas of law where gender is explicitly a relevant
issue, for example in family law. Most of the case law and academic analysis
in this area centres around what criteria the law should admit in the process
of attempting to establish an individual's gender. Such analysis. certainly
within the Australian academy, where t*s are perhaps relatively less visible
and politicised than in, say, North America, fairly universally adopts a
liberal, modernist rhetoric of 'humanity' and 'justice' in its advocacy of legal
recognition of sex reassignment surgery (SRS); but in so doing, replicates
medical constructions of t* identities as deviant and pitiable, of t*s as
unfortunate victims, and reities gender binarity ensuring the domestication
of potentially threatening gaps in certain key texts of heteropatriarchy (we
might call them canonical texts - I refer to modernist notions of the self and
sexuality). Such writing entirely overlooks the possibility of any L'fitique of
the medical construction of gender crossover phenomena.
Typical of such writing is the article 'The Legal Status of a Sexually
Reassigned Transsex.ual' by Margaret Otlowski (1990). She unLntically
imports medical (master) discourse regarding gender and hence becomes
complicit in depoliticising gender crossover. She speaks of the 'condition' of
'gender dysphoria'. and describes the transsexual as one 'ha[ving] physical
characteristics of one sex but who is psychologically a member of tbe
opposite sex' (Otlowski 1990: 67, my italics) - at once asserting the
opposition of gender, and of the 'psychological' and the 'biological'
ontological orders. The plight of the transsexual is in her view a grave one:
'Transsexuality is believed to be primarily a psychological disorder but a
disorder for which there is no known effective therapy ... [T]ranssexuals
may resort to hormone treatment and ultimately even sex reassignment
surgery .. .' (Otlowski 1990: 67). Yet there is help at hand, thank to the
miracle of scientific progress. Surgery can now enable 'quite impressive
results [to] be achieved, often producing remarkably functional members of
the opposite sex' (Otlowski 1990: 67). SRS is made to sound like open heart
surgery - a vital, life-saving but stunningly complex and sophisticated
medical procedure which only now, at the close of the twentieth century, do
we have available to us.
Note also the silent spaces in her article - aside from reference in the
course of her discussion of R v Harris and McGuiness, a case concerning a
postop ts and a full time cd, there is no mention of the experience of non-
transsexual-identifying t*s. Certainly, the traditional scientific and now
commonsensical differentiation of the extreme fetishist transvestite and the
gender dysphoric transsexual is left entirely unproblematised.




This issue [of marriage] is probably the most critical aspect
of the debate in respect of the legal recognition of post-
operative transsexuals. The institution of marriage has
traditionally been regarded as fundamental to our society
and, undoubtedly, holds special significance for
transsexuals who have undergone reassignment surgery,
since it is perceived as the ultimate recognitwn oftheir new
sexual status [my italics]. (Otlowski 1990: 67-8)
The subtext: post-operative transexuals are oftheir nature geared to the
promotion of patriarchy and its institutions. More of this later.
Representations of the crossed I ..
taxonomies of f .. >m crossover
F~>m t*s experience erasure in the legal and scientific literature as well
as within the queer and the (largely m~>f dominated) t* communities. A
range of commonsensical myths regarding the nature of female to male
crossover at once inscribe heteropatriarchal notions of gender and sexuality
and bound the voices of f->m t*s. I here take two examples.
The ftrst is the Truth that f->m crossover is generally motivated by a
desire (be it explicit or repressed) on the part of the t* to be 'taken seriously',
which in the context of p~triarchy means being taken for a man; and
conversely, that crossing never has any erotic significance. The possibility of
the female transvestite is denied. Finlay and Walters in Sex Change:
Transvestism is probably the most common disorder likely
to be confused with transsexualism. The transvestite, who is
always a biological male, obtains sexual gratification from
dressing in clothing of the opposite sex. (Finlay & Walters
1988: 28)
And Dr. Robert Stoller, who's text Sex and Gender constitutes the
obligatory cite on the issue:
[T]here are an extremely rare number of females who dress
all the time as men, live as men, work as men - in fact, pass
unrecognised in society as men. Are they not transvestites?
No - and again one must be careful that one is not merely
quibbling with words. These women are transsexuals, quite
comparable to male transsexuals. They wish to be males,
that is to have a body in every way male, and to live in all
ways as a man does. They cannot stomach sexual relations
with men; they are aroused only by women. Men's clothes
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have no erotic value whatsoever; these people have no
clothing fetish. (Stoller 1968: 1:195)
This refusal to admit of the possibility of non-SRS-oriented f->m
crossing (ie. the existence of the non-transsexual f->m t*) serves to rewrite
patriarchal myths concerning female sexuality - the outright rejection of the
idea that a female might be sexually aroused by male clothing is derivative
of the sexist notion that woman qua woman is at base an asexual/aerotic
being (or at the least, innately less sexual than a man). Further, this taxonomy
normaIises and naturalises gender binarity - it is considered perfectly
natural, given that men have greater status in a patriarchal culture, for
women to seek to be men, and hence there is no need to problematise f->m
crossover nor engage the critique of the gender dyad which such crossover
may constitute.
As one might expect, this desire-bIiJ)d construction of f->m crossing
belies the voices of f->m t*s themselves. The text Information for the
Female-ta-Male Crossdresser and Transsexual, having quoted Stoller and
others, observes:
It is any wonder that the female crossdresser hesitates to
come forward? It would be quite a stigma to be known as
the world's frrst and only woman who gets off on jockey
shorts!8 (1985: 7)
A second Truth which contributes to f->m exclusion within the queer and
t* communities themselves is that f->m t*s are 'less oppressed' than m->fs
because there is less social stigma against women wearing male clothing
than the reverse. While it is true that a certain degree of male dressing is
socially acceptable, there is a clear boundary which f->ms may not cross,
where mere 'tomboyishness' (in itself often sufficient to invite ridicule)
flows into an artefactual masculinity that threatens gender boundaries, and at
this point the ctosser runs real risks of verbal and physical violence. Being
able to wear boy's jeans does not solve all the problems of the f->m
transsexual, any more than the wearing of female underwear beneath his
masculine clothing will satisfy the m->f transsexual.
Further, to the degree that it is socially acceptable for women to don male
garb, f->m crossover becomes invisible. Writes James Green, editor of the
FTM Newsletter:
[T)bis invisibility makes understanding and self-acceptance
more difficult for the FfM because his desire to express
himself as a man is confused with lesbian-feminist and/or
androgynist politics. (Green 1994: 51-2)
Legal texts generally fail to make clear distinction between the situations
of the m->f and the f->m, and to this extent these texts serve to reinscribe the
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invisibility of f->m crossover generally, and certainly to erase nOll-
transsexual f->m identities.
THE CARE OF THE SICK
Sex Change by H A Finlay and William Walters (1988) is one of
Otlowski's primary references. The structure of this text betrays it" politics.
That the first half is written by a medical doctor (the expert opinion,
providing the 'facts' of the case), and the second, by a legal academic (the
'law'), symbolises as it reenacts the hegemony of these twin master
discourses.
The cover blurb of Sex Change chirps merrily:
There are people with a deep conviction that they were born
into the wrong sex. In the past, tbey suffered considerable
anguish and distress. Today a person can be given the
appearance and most of the functions of a member of the
opposite sex ... (Finlay & Walters 1988)
The text is similar to the Otlowski article in its representation of modem
science as salvation - with the implicit if patently ludicrous suggestion that
until this point in human history, ie. the advent of capital and with it, Science,
t*s were doomed to lead tragic, dissolute, unfulfilled lives. Walters is entirely
unambiguous in his representation of the transsexual as deviant and
'unfortunate' .
Fortunately, in most cases, gender identity conforms with
biological sexual identity. In a few instances in which this
does not occur, the condition of primary gender dysphoria
or true transsexualism develops.9
This is an irreversible psychological condition ... The
majority of subjects with primary gender dysphoria can
only be successfully treated by gender reassignment
involving hormonal therapy, breast surgery and surgical
transformation of the genital organs ...
In the absence of adequate medical assistance, individuals
with primary gender dysphoria may suffer mental
depression leading to self-mutilation or suicide or at best
may lead isolated and desperately unhappy lives punctuated
by episodes of prostitution, drug addiction and criminal
acts. (Finlay & Walters 1988: 35-6)
The second section of Sex Change is no less clear. 'The causes and
symptoms of transsexuality are now much better understood.' A moot point.
Finlay continues: 'In the more tolerant Western societies of today cases of
transsexuality are allowed to come into the open' (Finlay & Walters 1988:
45). Again, a moot point. Sex Change is clearly situated within the modernist
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metanarrative of grand scientific progress. It belies the reality that many
societies may be seen to have encompassed crossing phenomena better
(perhaps even more 'humanely') than our own, their ignorance of science
and of the liberal virtue of tolerance notwithstanding. A standard example is
the North American berdache, who appears to be a type of transgendered
shaman.
[I]n many Native American religions the berdaches often
have special ceremonial roles. [Genetically] male
berdaches also do some of the work attributed to women
and mix together much of the behaviour, dress, and social
roles of women with those of men. They gain social
prestige by their spiritual-intellectual or artistic
contributions, as well as by their reputation for hard work
and generosity. (Bullough & Bullough 1993: 3-4)
In contrasting their own 'liberal' and 'humane' perspectives Witll those of
the judgments in cases such as Corbett, we are given to understand the
writing of these academics to be in some way radical and oppositional. In
fact it is a clear case of outsiders speaking Other's truth, in this case, via the
deployment of the m~ter discourse of science. The ostensibly radical nature
of this writing (imagine writing 'about something like that) belies, as I
observed above, the essentially direct translation and redeployment within
the legal discursive space of scientific constructions of gender and identity.
Such theory has real political outcomes, an issue I address below.
Phyllis Frye, transsexual, enrolled at the University of
Houston Law Centre in 1978. The staff of forty spent
around five hours discussing whether Phyllis should be
allowed to attend. 'One thing that was clear was that most
of [us] were not going to directly confront why it was that
Phyllis shouldn't come to law school. So, we had to come
up with reasons that she couldn't come. We didn't want to
make ber feel uncomfortable using a bathroom. So, for her
sake, maybe we shouldn't let her into law school. .. , But we
carne up with it: she had her own bathroom. That was how
we resolved that. We built a Phyllis Frye bathroom.'
(Aldeman 1994: 10)
FOUCAULT AND THE SPEECH OF THE
MAD
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault (1977) traces the flows of
power/knowledge that facilitated the production of the docile body, a body
tailored to the technologies of the industrial revolution. He notes that in the
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eighteenth century torture was supplanted by the death sentence, executed in
an efficient and sanitary manner by the guillotine; entailing as a consequence
a decreasing focus on the body and specifically the body surface (something
essential to torture, which seeks to inscribe upon the body). Despite the
rhetoric of progress towards more liberal and humane means of punishment
during this period. we see a marked increase in the use(s) of punisbment-
surveillance of the body. of identity (citizens are required to carry papers)
becomes continuous, where once such body policing was limited to those
who had transgressed. In effect, a superficial humanitarianism has
legitimated more efficient economies of death, and of bodily control -
punishment is efficient discipline, omnipresent. It is at this point that crimes
become indicative of a criminal nature. 'Criminality' is theorised, becomes
the point of intervention (as distinct from the crime act itself). The goal of
punishment becomes the restoration of the original/natural/uncriminal Self. 10
In Madness and Civilisation, meanwbile, Foucault (1973) attempts to
uncover an origin of the discipline of psychiatry by returning to the historical
moment at which madness was an undifferentiated element of human
experience. He charts the rise of a discursive regime and institutional
practices which reified the rational self and set apart a mad self, an other,
whose speech became unintelligible. ll
Sexuality may be seen to operate in a manner analogous to c'riminality,
and the advent of a speech of the mad may be seen to mirror in certain
respects the silencing function of medicine as master discourse.
12
The
positing of a detetminate sexuality requires a modern subject with a 'deep
self', and enables the problematisation of this construct (which, invisibly,
imports a range of modernist/master ontological assumptions and
interpretations and politics) and the erasure of the boundary crossing actl;)
themselves. It becomes possible, then, to and theorise this sexuality as an
appropriate point of intervention. Further. Foucault's tracing of modenl
madness prompts a reading of the t* experience as one of marginalisation
and exclusion from the sites of tbeorisation of their experience. The voice of
the t* is unintelligible, for it is a madness discourse. No sense can be made
of a self 'after' gender or 'after' sexuality - these things are impossible to
conceptualise. Rather than problematise crossing as a site of rupture in the
coded text of gender, modem medicine has us problematise the individual's
'sexuality'. and read heirm as 'gender dysphoric', as a type of aosswiring in
the modem Self. The moment of resistance is medicalised, and depoliticised.
The disciplined body is foregrounded, and medical technologies and iLl;)
discursive formations are deployed to ensure/encode compliance, ie. the
production/engendering of the docile body.
Representations of the crossed II
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We have already seen the way in which t*s are pathologised, portrayed
as a class of sick persons requiring treatment. A second common
representation is that of the man in women's clothing who is (simply and no
more than) a man in women's clothing, or vice versa. In this representation,
the potentially radically destabilising effect of crossing is evaded through the
failure to problematise thefact ofcross-dressing itself This is a point Garber
(1992) makes well and repeatedly in her rme work of cultural criticism,
Vested Interests. She quotes in this context Sarduy's essay
'Writing/Transvestism'.
Transvestism '" is probably the best metaphor for what
writing really is: ... not a woman under whose outward
appearance a man must be hiding, a cosmetic mask which,
when it falls, will reveal a beard, a rough hard face, but
rather the very fact of transvestism itself ... the coexistence,
in a single body, of masculine and feminine signifiers: the
tension, the repulsion, the antagonism which is (;reated
between them. (Sarduy 1973: '33)
The transvestite then, does not signify. There is no anchored signified, no
deep self lurking behind the gender mask. What modernist discursive
regimes enforce is the erasure of the t* body. Medicine in fact literally
replaces the t* body, reconfigures the signifiers to stave off boundary
collapse.
Representations of the crossed III -
taxonomies of m->f crossover
A further politically relevant characteristic of hetstream representations
of crossing is the discrete classification of the m->f transvestite and tlle
transsexual. Why does mainstream theory dichotomise 'transvestism' and
'transsexualism'? How does such an approach lie with the voices of
crossers?
'Transvestism' is represented as sexual, moral, a perversion, an erotic
event, the domain of confessors (be they priests or psychiatrists). Invisibility,
that it remain tn private, that it remain 'kinky', is primary. This enables the
assertion that the transvestite's personal is not political ('I don't broadcast my
sexual habits to the world; why do you have to tell me about yours?')
'Transsexualism' , however and in contrast, is represented as real, material, a
'condition', 'curable' by an appropriate medical 'treatment'. This
dichotomisation operates to atomise, individualise and consequently to
depoliticise acts of crossing. Further, the base or locus of political action is
dispersed and any potential for radical oppositional speech and communal
political action is diffused.13
Quite aside from the political implications, such a construction of gender
82
Law /Text/Culture
crossover overlooks certain 'empirical' or, in Delgadoesque terminology,
narrative realities. Witness, for example, the frequency of passing fantasies
even among those not seeking nor planning to pursue in the future SRS; the
popularity of hormones among some cds in the absence of any desire for the
further step of SRS; the fact of full time cds; and most particularly, as we
shall see, the fact that and the means by which t*s are themselves trained to
write/read their biographies so as to generate acceptable selfs.14
T*s, J'true transsexuals' and marriage
rights
The lack of legal recognition of pastop gender status clearly seriously
negatively affects the quality of life of transexuals. However the
epistemology of gender uncritically imported by legal academics, and
particularly the failure to recognise the fluidity of the various categories of
gender-crossers noted above, may itself produce profoundly unjust
outcomes. For example, both Finlay (1988) and Otlowski (1990) would
appear to agree that only a 'full' or 'true transsexual' should be eligible for a
putative Sex Reassignment Certificate (Finlay's term - such a certificate
would enable legal marriage to a person of another gender and hence the
accruing of the rights associated with a legal marriage). Yet why should, for
example, a 24/7 cd who is on hormones, but has not undergone SRS, and has
lived in what to all intents and pUl'})oses is a 'real' marriage, be denied these
rights? 'Clothes maketh the woman/man.' Once the reified static categories
of 'true transsexual' and 'mere transvestite' tumble, the distinctions
psychiatrists and lawyers blithely assert become highly problematic.
It should perhaps be noted further that both Finlay and Otlowski consider
that failure on the part of the postop ts to advise their prospective partner
prior to the marriage of their genetic gender and their having undergone SRS
should be grounds for nullity (Finlay & Walters 1988: 121; Otlowski 1990:
74). It is hard to see why they adopt such a position. It would appear that they
consider that a partner must gift you your gender for it to be 'real' and
recognised by the law. It is unclear why their desire for a 'liberal and humane
approach' suddenly fails them at this point. To accept such a rule would be
in effect to relegate postop tss to a second-class marriage, a special type of
marriage in relation to which particular conditions apply.
Y*ism and feminism - the colonisation
of Women's spaces?
Some feminist theorists consider the advent of the
transsexual/transvestite/crossdresser voice a threat to feminist theory and
practice. Perhaps the most infamous example is Janice Raymond's (1980)
text, Transsexual Empire. Therein she constructs 'transsexualism' as a tactic
of late patriarchy to colonise women's speech and spaces, and to reinforce
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sexist constructions of femininity: the woman as of her essence obsessed
with appearance, witb conspicuous consumption, with tbe pleasing of men,
and so forth. She therefore sees the difficulties faced by those who
understand themselves to be transsexual as epiphenomenal of the oppression
of women - were it not for patriarchy, the transsexual would not exist. She
further sees f->m transexuals as epiphenomenal of (m->f, theoretically prior)
Transsexualism, they constituting a token of universality which facilitates
the naturalisation and hence legitimation of male colonisation. 15 However,
there is more at issue here than simply the biological.
Empires, of course, become empires, by spreading their
dominion to include seemingly quite disparate territories.
Thus it should not be surprising that transsexualism has
spread into the feminist community. The transsexual empire
initially colonized women's bodies. Now it has expanded to
colonize feminist identification, culture, politics, and
sexuality. (Raymond 1980: xx)
A little over a decade later Somer Brodribb attempts a tracing of
masculine philosophy's colonisation of woman's voice, confirming
Raymond's fears. She presents the gendercrosser as symbolic of/intrinsic to
the postmodern:
Our knowledge is untranslatable and inaudible in mixed
forums of masculine hegemony. Yet les honunes roses
abstract and parade a feminist language and theory made
textureless, without body, without speaking, female bodies.
We serve as the raw matter for an unaltered analysis which
has none of our values, we do not control this speech,
insidious, neutralized, dishonest recognition of the female,
spoken in a sexist practice. Yet it is we who are accused of
purism and intransigence when we refuse
absorption/invisibility of women's experience. We reject
\
Fouqmlt's power, Sartre's nothingness, Levi-Strauss's end
of the world, Lacan,s fatal desire, Derrida's wizardry,
Sade's creation through murder, Nietzsche's eternal return
of the masculine o/One. We refuse all these transvestites of
travesty. 16 (Brodribb 1992: 146)
These two texts are expressions within the academy of a more general
fear within feminist and lesbian-feminist circles that crossdressing males
represent an invasion. This fear is manifest in such moments as the exclusion
of lesbian transgens from the 1994 National Lesbian Conference in Brisbane
(this after aggressive and violent debate in a plenary meeting on the first day
of the conference; see Lesbians on the Loose Issue 56 Vol 5 No 8 (August
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1994) p. 1, 4); the extended debate over the exclusion of lesbian-identified
transgens from the Lesbian Space Project (see Lesbians on the Loose Issue
59 Vol 4 No 11 (November 1994) p. 7, 8); and the refusal mid-1993 by the
New South Wales-based Gay and Lesbian Rights Lobby to include
transgendered people in their overall charter for lobbying (see Campaign
207/June 93, p. 6).
Raymond's account and those of feminists like her are instantly
recognisable as 'false-consciousness' accounts, which relegate crossing
phenomena to secondary ontological status through positing a particular
relation of dependence between patriarchy and gender crossover. They argue
that crossover reifies gender boundaries in so far as it reassert\) the
univocality of the masculine ('Look, those transsexual models are even
sexier than real women!') and delegitimates an oppositional feminine.
Raymond and other t*-suspicious feminists share an unspoken assumption
regarding gender crossover, namely that passing is the epistemic object, the
Aristotelian causa jinalis. This grounds a (teleo)logics of gender crossover
as colonisation. Gender crossover is specifically and definitionally, on such
a view, for the purpose of generating (what can pass as) women's bodies with
men's minds(lsocialisation/politics/voice/[insert metaphor of choice]).
However, contra the imag(inari)es in Paris is Burning, not all m->f t*s
aspire to stereotypical models of femininity (masochism, sexual availability,
conspicuous consumption, etc). If t*s are sexist, lust after consumables
conspicuously, or profess a desire for a dominant man or a traditional
patriarchal power-inequitous relationship, it is as consequence of the same
dynamics of patriarchal power that enable some women and men to be and
to think these things. Contra Empire, a t* feminist is not a logical
impossibility.
The 'gender community' is a young community, and its philosophies
reflect its adolescence. As more writing appears recounting t* 'underside'
experiences of gender-ordered systems of power ('counterstories'), and as
theory is developed to frame such experience,17 a politicisation of t*
communities is potentiated - not (or not simply) mobilising politically to
lobby legislatures for 'gender rights' and 'freedom' from discnmination, but
further, the awakening of a feminist consciousness. Such an awakening
would entail an awareness of and a commitment to a critical
political/theoretical engagement with patriarchy, of the ways in which a
putative 'transgender oppression' is interrelated with the oppression of
women, an awareness of the manner in which the t* herself or himself is
oppressed by patriarchy.
But in what ways specifically might t*s be said to be 'victims of
patriarchy'? How might feminist theory be relevant to/aid in the theorisation
of t*s experience?
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M->f t*s and the art of auto-
biography (the writing of one's Self)
'But surely looks arentt everything?'
There is significant pressure on the preop t*s to read her or his life history
in accord with the prevailing medical model, for the quite practical reason
that otherwise SRS may be denied. One stark illustration is provided us in a
study which revealed that some doctors use their own sexual attraction to a
candidate for SRS as a criterion for suitability (Kessler & McKenna 1978:
118). This idea that the preop must be 'sexy' or 'feminine to be eligible for
the 'treatmenC ties in with the phenomenon of the cult of the beautiful
crosser, or the transsexual supermodel (a sort of analogue of the ideal/Real
Gay Man - the hypermasculine gay (who cannot possibly have AIDS, and is
even more masculine than his het counterpart)).
In a manner anaIogous to the. process I described earlier in the context of
typical bi coming out experiencest the prevailing models of gender and
sexuality themselves will generate a reading strategy (transparent, generally,
to the audience) by means of which the individual engages the 'text' of her
biography. Events will vacillate, pop in and out of awareness, accrue or shed
significance (the power of signification), in accord with the needs of the
body as produced by preVailing regimes of discipline. The product is the
gender-conservatism so prevalent in t* subculture.
A quick flip through the pages of a typical m->f-oriented crosser
magazine such as Tapestry provides ample illustration. The contents page of
issue 67 (Spring 1994), lists articles such as: 'On being the perfect house
guest' (p. 7)t 'The masculine and the feminine mindset' ('Like sexual
orientation, the masculine and the feminine mindset tend to be inborn. They
cannot be changed and they are difficult to disguise.') (p. 34), and 'On being
a womant (p. 35) which relates that:
A woman is born to carry another human being inside her
and to feed that other being from her body. Whether she
ever has a child or not, she always has a sense of herself as
the potential holder and nurturer of a new life. . ..
Metaphorically, babies are perpetually growing inside her,
and she feeds them through her attention to what is
happening, and nurtures them through her expression of
this inner self to the outside world.
GENDER AND BODY FEMINISM(S)
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A close reading of the text of gender engenders category quake. To
attempt 'pure description' (as is envisioned by science, and as is required by
the law (the court must have the facts) is to script - that is, to engage in a
creative, productive act. Within the postmodern moment, rather than seek a
true language (for example, a t*'s speech, a voice from the outside), in the
belief that the most oppressed is the most clear-sighted or possessed of the
highest truth value, the task is to de-script, or trace the script, map how
power is inscribed - on texts, surfaces, most especially, on the (post)modem
body.
Gender crossover is a point of transparency, of slippage, functioning
analogously in the context of 'gender' to bisexuality in the discourse of
'sexual orientation'. Marjorie Garber urges us to read/theorise the
crossdresser as surface, and not as depth, that we look at it, and not through
it (Garber 1992: 147-50). Elizabeth Grosz, meanwhile, in her attempt to
rewrite the postmodern for feminism, draws the body as a multifaceted
surface folded back on itself, a plane whose inscription produces the illusion
of interiority (Grosz 1994: 116). The body is text, fictionalised through
cultural narratives, to produce the docile body appropriate to the exigencies
of the age. Dress, makeup, hairstyle - these thing are then part of the biology
ofthe postnwdern body. And so the t* dressing up is a quite literal analogue
of the muscle-mary's gym-work - they are both engaged in body building.
Medical/modernist political versus postmodem political discourses
regarding t* phenomena -may be understood then as a dispute over the
boundaries of the body. Is the Real Body in the mind, or the heart, and is it
contained by the skin, or, at the other extreme, is it coextensive with the
social? Wherein, as Baudrillard might frame the question, resides the
simulation, and wherein the real?
HETEROPHOBIA - FEAR OF DIFFERENCE
IN OTHERSPACE
Gay and other non-het groups' interests do not always coincide. For
example, gay assimilationists often argue crossdressers should stay at home
in the closet rather than march at the head of rallies or have their names in
the titles of organisations - at least 'at this early stage' - a~ out
crossdressers harm the attempt to portray 'gay and lesbian lifestyles' a~
alternatives tolerable to the mainstream. One powerful recent example of
lesbians and gays abandoning marginalised others within the queer
community is the 1994 expulsion of the North American Man-Boy Love
Association (NAMBLA) and two other similar organisations from !LOA.
I would contrast philosophically liberal lesbian and gay political praxis
- which, grounded as it is in a discourse of minority rights and tolerance, is
concerned to forward a 'we're just regular folks' message, marginalises and
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silences groups such as bisexuals, t*5, those concerned with
intergenerational relationships, sm players, and so forth - with a
postmodem-aware so-called 'micropolitical', 'in your face' style of political
action that some denote by the term 'queer'.
The frrst and presently dominant model of lesbianJgay praxis is embodied
in the Pride Day. The Pride March is a public celebration of lesbian/gay
community, and, in the tradition of participatory democracy, an expression of
a point of view. It focuses on identity ('We're here, we're queer!') and on
being out ('We're here, we never sleep willi otller genders!'). Legal refonn
is the dominant mode of political action, to be achieved through letter
writing campaigns, boycotts of companies with discriminatory practices,
regular lobbying of politicians and organisations, and public education. The
manifestation of this praxis within the academy, inter alia, in legal texts, is to
emphasise sameness, to emphasise the commonalities between a putative
'lesbian' or (more often) 'gay' and a 'het' experience. This is only possible
through the erasure of difference within our communities. The approach
Fajer (1992) adopts embodies this paradigm.
The strategy adopted by the Tasmanian Gay and Lesbian Rights Group in
the present dispute over Tasmania's anti-same sex laws also aspires to this
paradigm. This is reflected both in the Group's exclusionary title, and in it>;
framing of the dispute over the laws as 'the gay law refonn debate' - this
despite the fact of the laws directly affecting the lives and violating the
human rights of bisexual Tasmanians, and perhaps less directly but certainly
still importantly, also affecting the lives of Tasmanian lesbians and t*s (in so
far as the laws contribute to an ongoing aunosphere of state-sanctioned hate
and fear).18 We have yet to hear either the word 'bisexual' or the word
'transsexual' or similar mentioned in either the print or television media in
the context of this debate. (In the specific case of bi rights, and an admission
of the existence of bi Tasmanians would be to (i) threaten the oppositional
dyad of bet-bomo, and may thereby be seen to lend credence to anti-queer
representations of queer identity as mutable and subject to change. in
schools, in counselling clinics, in the het bedroom, and (ii) to create
dangerous divisions (or rather, make visible the already existent fissures)
within queer discourse itself (I resist with difficulty referring to it as the
'queer camp')). Here in Tasmania, there is little need to assert that bis are
closeted lesbians or gays; we can simply neglect to use the word.
One of the primary sites of conflict between the lesbian and gay
leadership and other queer groups has been the naming of non-het political
and cultural bodies. It is interesting to observe tbat the types of arguments
marshalled to defend the phrase 'Lesbian and Gay' as all-inclusive are
startlingly similar to arguments regularly deployed to exclude women from
pUblic discourse. Typical examples include the assertion that Lesbian and
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Gay means everyone; or that appropriately inclusive sentences would be too
long to be practical; or that inventing such labels is to be politically correct
(and hence, presumably, not worth our time); and that we should stop
wasting valuable time and effort indulging in silly and trivial word games
and get back to really doing things.
The explicit rationale informing Mardi Gras, as the queer event presently
most visible to the Australian hetstream, is outrageousness. That is, Mardi
Gras is understood to represent a refusal (and a raucous one) to adopt
normative heterosexist constructions of sexuality, morality and propriety.
There is a certain transgressive value here, perhaps. However such a
portrayal belies certain political realities, such as the ghettoisation of gay life
(the symbol of which is Oxford Street). Deploying the liberal rhetoric of
tolerance and the symbolics of Australian multiculturalism, 'the gays' are
presented as just another ethnic minority, and Mardi Gras becomes a sort of
ethnic festival. The threat of any seriously destabilising critique of
heterosexist, sexist society, and of any deconstructive, destructive, critical
power is neutralised.
The new fascists - the pink-shirts. Lesbian-IGaySpace must
be made pure! 'Everybody wants to be a fascist.' Why?
Because modem bodies need determinate Others if they are
to stabilise boundaries and hence contain their organs.
Some have criticised Stonewal125 - Stonewall having been adopted not
only in North America but in Australia also as a type of genesis story - as
baving been appropriated by a mainstream liberal lesbian and gay movement
keen to erase difference, and as having degenerated into a marketing
opportunity for corporations interested in capturing the 'gay dollar' (see for
example Julia (1994)). The broader question of the complicity between gay
discursive hegemony and the condition of late capital is an interesting one.
It might be said that what is inappropriate to late capital, is appropriated by
late capital. Today, we can purchase our sexual identities; purchase our
bodies. Culture collapses into postculture, and 'gay' literally becomes a
question of style - we move from Tasmania to Oxford Street, we buy dance
music, we toss forth Absolutely Fabulousisms. It would seem that the closet
is much bigger than we had originally thought. Or perhaps, we have fled the
closet, but are yet to exit the master's house.
(CONC/DE!IL)LUSIONS - Our future in
the belly of the postmodern
Baudrillard Freud simulacrum Lacan surface t/rruth Derrida power
gender Voice Stonewall fag flow cyborg Queer smlbdpraxis identity o/Other
Nature space meaning Nietzsche genderfuck God telos ulUs polyvocality
rhizome difference Foucault Haraway homosexual capitalism Butler
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Madonna flight History informatics domination science fiction(s)
GenreQuake hyperreal subaltern arborescence networks BwO HN/AIDS
anatomy s/Sel[microfascist I integrated circuits inscription desire i
LAW, LANGUAGE, LITERATURE
The postmodem suggests that botb science and the law constitute
language-work. The latter might come as small surprise, but the former is
somewhat counterintuitive; and once we have retheorised science as politics,
a new understanding of the lingual nature of law is potentiated. The lawyers'
tools are words.
Within the postmodem moment and after the death of God, however,
epistemologies conceiving of a truth in orbit of the Logos (word-made-tlesh;
literally in the case of the transsexual patient), collapse. What Deleuze and
Guattari write of books might equally well be said of legal texts:
We will never ask what a book means, as signified or
signifier; we will not look for anything to understand it. We
will ask ",:hat it functions with, in connection with what
other things it does or does not transmit intensities, in
which other multiplicities its own are inserted and
metamorphosed, and with what bodies without organs it
makes its own converge. A book exists only through the
outside and on the outside. (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 4)
Gay groups lobbying their governments for anti-discrimination
legislation will not bring liberation, if not only then importantly because
'gay' is the subservient term in a dyad which routes and maintains a master
discourse. The het-homo opposition is a circuit.
The reading strategy Deleuze and Guattari propose in 'Rhizome)
foregrounds the complicity of standard posttnodem oppositional theory's
core assumptions regarding identity and voice; and generates a theoretical
space from\ which we may perhaps formulate new strategies of opposition.
,
How do we materially (as distinct from theoretically)
deconstruct the subject? Mass outing? Mass genderfuck?
The violent overthrow of the state? Succeeding from the
political system (say, anarchist communes)? Exploiting the
play in texts from within academic institutions?
Establishing queer advocacy/consciousness-raising
centres? Or, by appropriating/rewriting master texts
(femme~butch lesbianism, smbd culture, queer porn,
'political drag', affirming marriage and child
bearing/rearing as legitimate options for queer
couples/families, utilising religious texts (prayers,
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ceremonies, institutions) to celebrate and aftlrm queers in
their various life events (birth, coming out, relationship,
death)?
PLURALISM, POLYVOCALITY
One serious difficulty with a Matsudian postmodem pluralist
jurisprudence is that, as we have seen in both the cases of t* and lesbian/gay
communities, the underside voices are characterised by their saturation in the
normative discursive paradigms of heteropatriarchy and late capital.
While the postmodern will not permit of a false~consciousness critique,
it would seem inappropriate to seek to privilege tlle 'voice' of, say, the
transsexual, when gender-conservatism is so obviously rife in that
community.
'I am a woman trapped in a man's body.' The transsexual
refrain invites us to peer into our souls, inspect (and so
affrrm) our interiority, on a search for our (hidden) truth,
our (repressed) voice(s). Identity politics is new flesh for
old bones. Contra: the interior as a function of the body. The
technology of reassignment rewrites our innards as it
replaces our organs. 'I am a body trapped in a man's
woman.'
Polyvocal!counterstory jurisprudence (Delgado's (1989, 199Ga, 199Gb)
work in the area of narrative jurisprudence, while not explicitly from the
perspective of the postmodem, is a good example of this type of account) is
flawed in so far as it overlooks a tendency to arborescence. It implicitly
postulates, and quickly comes to depend upon, the detenninate, situated
Other; and belies, and may operate finally to erase, heterogeneity within
Other spaces. There is an unspoken law that the suffering are relatively
epistemologically pure - that suffering ennobles.
Delgado's scheme of narrative jurisprudence, and other polyvocal
accounts, become problematic if the possibility of 'raw' experience to
ground an Other voice is denied. There is no 'black experience', no 'gay
experience', no 'transsexual experience' - at least, no such experience
innocent of politics.
There must be more to a new oppositional jurisprudence than the LTy for
'common-cause signifiers', like 'queer'.
What we need is a model of power, and hence a jurisprudence or theory
of 'legal power', that is capable of mapping the processes by which identity
and experience and voice are produced; an account which, in other words,
incorporates a critique of vocal situation, which seeks to uproot Deleuze and
Guattari's 'trees in our heads'. Hence a politics/micropolitics of generation-
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of bodies, of subjects.
We must ask: How is the subject constitutedldomained? How is the
subject disrupted/ruptured? How is praxis complicit? and How is theory
complicit?
NEW PROJECTS - INVERSION
MECHANICS
For, if it is true that at the heart of power relations and as a
permanent condition of their existence there is an
insubordination and a certain essential obstinacy on the part
of the principles of freedom, then there is no relationship of
power without the means of escape '" [my italics]
(Foucault 1982: 255)
One suggestion is that in and/or perversion of elements in a binary power
hierarchy itself effects political/material deconstruction and facilitates
reinscription. One example is afforded us in the work of Jonathan Dollimore.
Transgressive reinscript~on: a turning back upon something
and a perverting of it typically if not exclusively through
inversion and displacement ...
Fantasy may itself be a kind of transgressive reinscription,
one presupposing a radical impurity in all identity, not
excluding the transgressor's ... The very impurity that the
radical humanist seeks to transcend, only despairingly to
rediscover at the very centre of his or her being - tllis
impurity, for the fantasies of the transgressive reinscription,
is not the ground of its failure but the material upon which
it works. (Dollimore 1991: 323, 324-5)
Derridians would observe that there is no power of opposition 'in' the
Oilier, as cQnsequence of the fact that it is only in the Other's location vis~a­
vis the Thing that it may continue to exist. The displacement of the elements
from their relative positions, specifically, the resiting of the subservient term,
via exposure of the symbiotic relation pertaining between the dominant and
the subservient, effects a destabilisation of the hierarchy.
Thus it may be argued that femme-butch lesbianism, dominatrixes,
lesbian dicks, and crossdressers and genderfuckers are material
micropolitical practices that in the fact of their existence effect a
deconstruction of master discourses regarding identity, specifically
sex/gender and orientation/desire.
The best critiques of such a project come from radical feminism(s). It
may be argued that the implication that both terms are, so to speak,
potentially dominant, and the fact that relation entails domination is accepted
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a priori, together serve to naturalise hierarchy and to obscure the fact that the
subservient term (the Other) is rarely if ever (and only provisionally) in a
dominant position (ie. being on top when you (a woman) come, or
occasionally penetrating a male lover with a plastic dick, does not of il~elf
entail the crumbling of patriarchy). Occasional instances of CTossover
perpetuate the myth of mobility, and simultaneously effect the colonisation
of others' speech. Annalee Newitz:
When they dress up in other people's bodies and clothes,
transgendered people and slummers [middle class
Americans who cross racial and class boundaries to
'experience 'authentic' - and usually cheap - food,
music and crafts produced by disadvantaged minority
groups'] play at living in a world where social mobility is
possible for everyone. Believing in the fantasy that all
history is 'the same', they are happy to let most people
remain oppressed as they have 'always' been.... Moving
around playfully within a social system is very different
from dismantling the system itself. (Newitz 1993: 2,3)
I would also recall in this context the various feminist, race, and neo-
Marxist theorists who seek to historicise the postmodern, observing the co-
incidence of the postmodem and late capital (with the decline of the nation
state, the portability/mobility of capital, the increasing import of information
technologies etc), and theorising the postrnodern as a coded discourse
primarily spoken to white men by other white men within the Western
academy. See Jameson (1984), and the various feminists who have
highlighted the way in which Foucault and others have been deployed within
the postmodern moment, postmodemism itself constitutive of discursive
formations marginalising potentially destabilising critique (for example,
Brodribb (1992: 39-60».
OF OTHER OTHERS
The notion of 'difference-in-itself' (a reversal of the
Kantian Ding an Sich, so beloathed of Nietzsche)
constitutes at rust sight a paradox. One possible reading:
the gaylestream is a difference-in-itself, it being a discourse
grounded in a determinate lesbian!gay identity, which exists
in opposition - as the subservient, putatively potentially
subversive symbiot (Other) - to a determinate het identity.
In-itselfedness will always bound, directing the flows of
desire/power, and will always screw the other Others.
How does oppositional theory sprout roots? Firstly, all oppression is
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reduced to epiphenomena of the basic or primary master-slave dichotomy.
For example: women are the workers of the family and will be liberated
when workers are free; female sm bottoms are mistaken as to their desire and
will no longer crave domination after women are freed; gays are oppressed
because they threaten the boundaries of the feminine, and gays will no longer
be oppressed once patriarcby fails; crossdressers are gays/lesbians who
cannot accept their same-sex desire, and who will no longer need to
rationalise their love through gender-crossover once the hetrarchy falls. I
recall here the words of Dennis Altman in bis famous book, Homosexual:
My personal belief (hope?) is that transvestitism/sexism
would disappear were our social norms not so repressive of
men who exhibit 'feminine' traits or vice versa. Similarly I
suspect sado-masochism is a product of a screwed-up
sexuality that is also likely to pass. (Altman 1972: 136)
It is suggested by some that a politics of identity is a prerequisite for
conunon political action, and that modernist discursive tools might safely be
redeployed on a local·scale provided one is cognisant of their constructed
nature. Problem: this is precisely what has been claimed by some regarding
the Tasmanian Gay and Lesbian Rights Group's approach to queer politics in
Tasmania, but this claim does not impair its exclusionary discourse.
You may make a rupture, draw a line of flight, yet there is
still a danger that you will reencounter organisations that
restratify everything, formations that restore power to a
signifier, attributions that reconstitute a SUbject - anything
you like, from Oedipal resurgences to fascist concretions.
Groups and individuals contain microfascisms just waiting
to crystallize. (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 9-10)
Such a project of 'local essentialism' becomes another rationalisation for
inaction - the main game must be fought, and secondary modes of
oppression will' fade away after liberation. This reduction serves to screen
discourse, and ensures that radical voices (those which might threaten the
symbiotic relationship pertaining between the mainstream and the
determinate Others) are silenced. For if all second, third and x-order modes
of 0- and repression will fall away with the successful resolution of the
primary master-slave opposition, secondary/epiphenomenal voices or
perspectives may safely be ignored.
OF RHIZOMES AND DISEMBODIED
SELVES
A iurisprudence of resisting Difference
Deleuze's postmodem dividual: people are today in parts, in the
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databanks of insurance rums, banks, government departments, and so forth.
But in addition, our dividuals are increasingly projected, or perhaps more
accurately, extended; for example across the Internet (via MUDs, MUSEs.
MOOs. ire. teluet talkers, the world wide web). And some of these soft
machines are expressly concerned with simulation, with the generation of
artifactual bodies (bodies which are facts but also the products of art);
themselves being literal as well as metaphorical 'texts', they give rise to
virtual spaces where women are men and men are women, where, as tlle
phrase goes, white is black and black is white.19
AIDS as antibody. HIV/AIDS has been termed the
postmodem disease. In a manner similar to orientation
crossover, and to gender crossover. it problematises binarity
- for example and particularly the notion of the discrete,
impermeable body. The question then becomes: What are
the boundaries of the body?
The rhizome has no layers, no depth, and no stasis, but simply rather lines
of flow, a proliferation of points of contact/context. Language, including
particularly theory. may be understood to effect a temporary stabilisation of
this flux or flow, which may have as consequence either stabilisation into
arborescence, or a flowering into new sets of rhizomes. Upon the lines of
flight, the flows of perverse desire, arborescence will crystallise, and
microfascisms inevitably appear. The (re)solution is the reconnection of the
rhizomes. We as modem individuals focus or write our Selves at moments or
points of coherence/crystaIlisation/arborescence. But might we not posit a
postmodem dividual who is capable of riding, if only for a time, the
boundaries?
The t* may be described/scripted as an autbentic/originary Body without
Organs (BwO). It is a true schizophrenic identity, a rhizome-self, perhaps a
specific type of Deleuzean dividual. (The t* is schizophrenic not in the sense
of being pathological. nor of being possessed of a multiple self (as is the case
with multiply personality disorder). Rather, the term schizophrenic denotes a
special, 'other' way of interacting with and reading the body and the world,
a distinct mode of experience, of which the dispersal of the modem Self, and
the advent of the diasporaI self, is constitutive. A Foucaultian mad self.)
The middle is by no means an average; on the contrary, it is
where things pick up speed. Between things does not
designate a localizable relation going from one thing to the
other and back again, but a perpendicular direction, a
transversal movement that sweeps one and the other away,
a stream without beginning or end that undermines its
banks and picks up speed in the middle. (Deleuze &
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Guattari 1987: 25)
In contrast to centred (even polycentric) systems with
hierarchical modes of communication and preestablished
paths, the rhizome is an acentered, nonhierarchical,
nonsignifying system without a General and without an
organizing memory [inter alia collective or individual
biography] or central automaton, defined solely by a
circulation of states. What is at question in the rhizome is a
relation to sexuality ... that is totally different from
arborescent relation: all manner of 'becomings.' (Deleuze
& Guattari 1987: 21)
Examples of such centred and polycentric systems include Rawlsian
original position reasoning and the overlapping consensus, Matsudian
multiple-consciousness as jurisprudential method, and Harding's feminist
standpoint epistemology. Also included of course is the official mythology of
the common law - the Platonic epistemology that is taught in law schools, of
ratio and dicta, of thv eternal Word and its instantiation. What might an
account of the law deriving from a rhizome ontology look like? What would
result were static notions of golden threads and underside voices discarded
for a reading of the 'becomings', the 'in-processes', the plateau in the
specific Deleuze and Guattarian sense of postoriginalJpostterminal?
MUSINGS
There is no natural position, no Eden-state; power is everywhere. The
subject, the coded identity, may only be subverted, from within, and cannot
be (re)created ex nihilo. It may be argued that exclusion potentiates
reconstruction/subversion, in the sense of the writing of new or different
bodies, new or differing modes of subjectivity. The bi and the genden,'I'osser
may (temporarily) constitute a privileged site of intervention into
mainstream discourses regarding gender and orientation. This would not be
to privilege any putative bisexual or t* 'voice', or even 'voices' - rather, we
might adopt these fledgling subjects, these partly constituted but redolent-
with-fissures bodies-in-process as points of theorisation. The crossdressers
seams are showing.
NOTES
1 The exclusive use of the masculine gender here is of course intentional.
2 I use the term t* as a general provisional term to denote the range of crossing
behaviours, including transvestitism (tv), crossdressing (cd), full time crossdressing
(2417), pre- and postop transsexualism (ts), and so forth.
3 This is not however to suggest that individuals who so identify proffer a perspective
that is in some sense 'pure'. In fact, the mechana of patriarchy are hard at work within
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these identities and the communities which they facilitate/facilitate them. More on this later
4 Whether this difference is one of ontology or real experience is a moot point: as is of course
the question whether such a distinction between ontology and 'real experience' is valid.
5 This despite an admission by way of footnote (no. 116, p. 535) that 'some lesbians ohject
to the term 'gay' to refer to people of both genders'. He apparently considers that the use of
the word gay serves to foreground the commonalities between the lesbian and the gay
experience. I would argue that recognition of difference is a far higher priority, and that the
use of the term gay is yet another example of masculine discursive hegemony.
6 'Because society polarises sexual orientation, I include self-identified bisexuals with gay
men and lesbians.' Well. that's a good reason. He continues: 'Generally speaking. similar
kinds of discrimination from non~gay society await them when they make their bisexual
interests known and so as to the issues that I address, their interests are similar' (Fajer 1992:
536). (The term 'bisexual interests' is an intriguing one. I am uncertain what he could mean
by this. How exactly does one express a 'bisexual interest' ---other than perhaps by
expressing the desire to have sex with people of different genders simultaneously?)
7 I would not wish to be read as thereby claiming that what one might term a queer or a
feminist science is impossible. It is simply (and literally) inconceivable, at this historical
moment.
8 See also Marjorie Garber's (1992: 44-46) brief but interesting discussion of female fetishist
erasure. upon which my discussion draws.
9 The precise implications of a 'true transsexualism' I address below.
10 For an extended and consequently rather more accurate overview of Foucault's thought in
this area. see the extracts collected in Rabinow (1984: 169-239).
11 Once more, see Rabinow (1984: 123-67).
12 Foucault (1976) has much to say regarding the development of modem sexuality and Its
relation to 'scientific discursivity'. Particularly interesting is his notion of a technique of
confession and his tracing of its incorporation into modem techniques of power (1976: 65-
7). It would perhaps prove an interesting exercise were one to rewrite the politics of vocality
from the perspective a kind of neo-Foucaultian 'will-to-confession'. Unfortunately there is
not the space to do so here.
13 This is analogous to the situation of women, whose oppression also is individualised by
moral systems and by the institutional supports of these systems (eg. the traditional .private ,
family).
14 It should be noted that DSM IV recognises the possibility of tv/ts crossover; 302.3
'Transvestic Fetishism' may include 'Gender Dysphoria'. See Diagnostic and Statist£( af
Manual ofMental Disorders IV (1994).
IS She argues that those who understand themselves to be f->m t*s should really identify as
lesbian feminists. To which I might reply, some do.
16 Rather more illustrative, but too sizable to quote, are Brodribb (1992: 67-70. 127-8).
17 A th . .
eonsatIon of gender-as-power; this distinct from the use of crossing aq metaphor for
other social phenomena/discursive deployments/exercise of power/modes of representation
Of, ~ppropriation - an intriguing development within the academy which ha" borne ripe
cntical fruit, certainly, but is quite distinct from the type of political writing I am suggesting
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here.
18 The term. 'gay law refaIm' also overlooks the fact that anal intercourse between
differently gendered persons is crirninahsed by the Tasmanian Cmninal Code (1924).
19 Of course such virtual spaces are vulnerable to a 'slumming' critique - access to
the technology that enables such virtual extension is limited by and large to
businesses and universities in the 'developed world', clnd hence are primarily the
domain of white males.
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